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DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN A DIGITIZED
WORLD: REGULATING INTERNET
SPEECH IN SCHOOLS TO FURTHER THE
EDUCATIONAL MISSION
The Internet is a remarkable tool—so remarkable that using the word
“tool” to describe it is painfully inadequate. With a click of a mouse, a
few strokes on a keyboard, or a swipe on a screen, the Internet allows
instant communication and transaction at any time by anyone in the
world. Young people, especially, have embraced the Internet as a means
of communicating with peers and interacting with the world around them.
In fact, the Internet may be thought of as a social context—similar to
school, church, or home—where young people’s identities are influenced
and shaped. As a result, what takes place online may have implications in
the off-line world.
One of those offline places implicated by Internet expression is the
public school system. Public elementary and high schools are unique
institutions. They have long been recognized as playing a dominant role
in maintaining our democratic society by inculcating in students certain
values such as respect, honesty, citizenship, responsibility, and integrity.
And, because public students enjoy less constitutional protections on
school grounds and during school hours, public schools have been
permitted to discourage expression and behavior that conflicts with those
values. But there is a disagreement over whether public schools may
discourage Internet expression that conflicts with those values. This
Comment seeks to explain why permitting schools to limit certain Internet
expression—regardless where or when the Internet expression occurred—
promotes the educational mission of public schools.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Jane is an average teenager. She is a sophomore at the public
school where she has a 3.24 grade point average, goal tends for the
junior varsity soccer team, and is a member of the Italian Club. Jane has
a part-time job at the movie theater and sometimes babysits her younger
sister when her mom works late. In addition to these regular activities,
on a typical day Jane spends four hours and twenty-nine minutes
watching television shows, two hours and thirty-one minutes listening to
music, one hour and twenty-nine minutes using the computer for
purposes other than school-related activities, one hour and thirteen
minutes playing video games, and one hour and thirty minutes texting
2
her friends. In all, Jane spends an average of seven hours and thirtyeight minutes per day—seven days a week—exposed to some form of
3
media technology.
For schools, this excessive media-use phenomenon can be troubling,
especially if Jane decides to create a fake profile, posing as one of her
4
teachers, on a social networking site containing offensive content.
Because of the connectivity of youth today, views of that profile will
likely spread like wildfire among other students and community
5
members. If this situation unfolds, the school faces a crossroads: the
school can punish Jane and demand that she delete the profile—running
the risk that this action will violate Jane’s First Amendment rights—or
the school can do nothing and tolerate student behavior that runs afoul
of the school’s educational mission.

1. Jane is a fictional person representing the average American teenager.
2
2. VICTORIA J. RIDEOUT ET AL., GENERATION M : MEDIA IN THE LIVES OF 8- TO 18YEAR-OLDS 2–3 (Jan. 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/8010.pdf.
3. Id. In the past five years, the number of hours an average eight- to eighteen-year-old
spends connected to media has increased by one hour and seventeen minutes per day—the
numbers add up to a total of fifty-three hours per week that young people are connected to
some form of media. Bonnie Miller Rubin, Teen, Tween Media Use Rising, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
20, 2010, at 4 (reporting on the Kaiser Family Foundation findings).
4. See generally Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech About
School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591
(2011) [hereinafter Waldman, Badmouthing Authority] (discussing the challenges that the
Internet and digital communication pose to regulating student speech originating outside of
schools).
5. See Douglas MacMillan, Chasing Facebook’s Next Billion Users, BUS. WK., July 25,
2012, at 30–31; Somini Sengupta, Facebook Revenue Edges Ahead of Expectations, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, at B1 (indicating that of the one billion Facebook users, 60% access the
social networking website from their mobile phones).
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Pointing out the dilemma created by student Internet expression is
6
by no means a novel observation. Numerous cases have emerged
involving students who were punished by schools for their Internet
7
expressions. Many commentators have discussed the need for guidance
from the Supreme Court and have proposed tests for how to deal with
8
these types of cases. Some commentators advocate the position that
student expression on the Internet can never be regulated by school
9
authorities. Some propose that schools can curtail expression only if it
targets students but never if it is directed at the school or its
10
authorities. And others suggest that schools should be able to regulate
student Internet speech only in extremely limited circumstances, such as
when the speech could reasonably be interpreted as a serious threat to
11
cause bodily injury or when the Internet user allows public access to his
12
or her expression. Other suggestions for tests for student Internet

6. See, e.g., Alexander G. Tuneski, Note, Online, Not on Grounds: Protecting Student
Internet Speech, 89 VA. L. REV. 139, 140 (2003) (“Today, the threat of disruption from offcampus student speech has risen significantly because of the advent of the internet and
continued efforts to integrate the medium into the classroom setting.”).
7. See infra Part III.
8. See Harriet A. Hoder, Note, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public
School Jurisdiction over Students' Online Activity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1594–96 (2009)
(suggesting a “control and supervision test to determine school jurisdiction over students’
online speech”); Sandy S. Li, Note, The Need for a New, Uniform Standard: The Continued
Threat to Internet-Related Student Speech, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 65, 102 (2005)
(suggesting that the Tinker standard be used because “it is both broad and flexible enough to
balance the needs of a student’s right to self-expression and the school’s need to maintain an
orderly and safe educational environment”).
9. See Frank D. LoMonte, Shrinking Tinker: Students are “Persons” Under Our
Constitution—Except When They Aren’t, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1325–26 (2009).
10. See Jacob Tabor, Note, Students’ First Amendment Rights in the Age of the Internet:
Off-Campus Cyberspeech and School Regulation, 50 B.C. L. REV. 561, 591–93 (2009) (arguing
that student speech can only be curtailed if it disrupts the classroom learning environment
and that off-campus student speech aimed at teachers, the school, or the administration
cannot reach that level).
11. See Adam Dauksas, Comment, Doninger’s Wedge: Has Avery Doninger Bridged the
Way for Internet Versions of Matthew Fraser?, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 459 (2010)
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s analysis should rest on whether a reasonable person in the student’s
position would foresee that any user . . . would reasonably interpret the speech as a serious
expression of intent to cause bodily harm.”).
12. See Kara D. Williams, Comment, Public Schools vs. MySpace & Facebook: The
Newest Challenge to Student Speech Rights, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 707, 726 (2008) (“[A] workable
standard for determining whether students’ postings . . . are protected by the First
Amendment must consider whether the students opted to set their profiles to private.”).
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speech include a categorical approach, a factors test, and a
15
16
reexamination of the Tinker standard. These are just a few examples
of the proposed tests for school regulation of student Internet speech,
but they are all testaments to the complexity of the problem faced by
schools and the need for a uniform standard.
This Comment does not propose yet another workable standard for
the Supreme Court to fashion when it ultimately hears a student
Internet speech case. Rather, it discusses that the Supreme Court
precedent, as well as state constitutions and statutes, already establish
the authority of schools to limit student expression on the Internet that
is directed at the school or school officials, even if the speech originates
beyond the schoolyard. In doing so, this Comment explores both the
Court’s historical emphasis on the role of schools in educating students
17
on how to be citizens in a democratic society, and the way the Internet
is infiltrating our lives not only as a communication and information
18
tool, but also as a social context. Because of this important role of
schools and the pervasiveness of the Internet in society, the Court
should decide that schools have the discretion to punish their students
for speech that harasses teachers on the Internet.
Part II addresses how the goals of public education, particularly the
cultivation of civic values, have shaped Supreme Court decisions on

13. See Caitlin May, Comment, “Internet-Savvy Students” and Bewildered Educators:
Student Internet Speech is Creating New Legal Issues for the Educational Community, 58
CATH. U. L. REV. 1105, 1138–41 (2009) (proposing that off-campus student speech that
“advocates violence within the school community” be exempt from First Amendment
protection and that non-threatening speech remain “the traditional fact-based analysis
articulated in Tinker”).
14. See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 262–69 (2001) (outlining a
five-factor test for student speech cases); David J. Fryman, Note, When the Schoolhouse Gate
Extends Online: Student Free Speech in the Internet Age, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 557, 589–91 (2009); Stephanie Klupinski, Note, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate:
Rethinking Student Speech in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 647–50 (2010).
15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
16. See Li, supra note 8, at 102–03 (proposing that only the substantial disruption test in
Tinker can be used to determine whether schools unconstitutionally infringed on student
Internet speech); Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the “Outer Boundaries” of the
First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into
Cyberspace, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731, 765 (2010) (“If the school claims that the
expression [is] threatening, it should be analyzed under Tinker’s ‘rights of others’ prong.”).
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
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student speech. Part II.A outlines the origin of public education in the
United States and then examines the goals of public school education
today. Part II.B discusses the Supreme Court precedent on student
speech, focusing on the Court’s interpretation of the school’s role in
relation to students’ rights. Understanding the Supreme Court’s
characterization of the role of schools as inculcating democratic values is
important to understanding the Court’s rationale for previous
19
decisions. The Court’s underlying rationale provides a guideline for
future decisions.
Part III analyzes several lower court decisions involving student
speech expressed on the Internet. This Part compares those cases where
the courts have ruled in favor of school limitation on student speech
with those cases where the courts found school limitations to be
unconstitutional. This Part seeks to examine the relationship between
the lower courts’ decisions and Supreme Court precedent.
Part IV.A examines how the Internet is changing rapidly and
becoming a necessary tool in many peoples’—especially teenagers’—
daily lives. Part IV.B discusses how harassing comments on the Internet
can materially disrupt the school environment, and suggests that schools
ought to have the discretion to regulate Internet expression that disrupts
the educational mission.
II. THE EDUCATIONAL MISSION AND STUDENT SPEECH
Since 1969, the Supreme Court has heard and decided only four
cases involving the public schools’ authority to limit student speech in
20
public schools. However, none of these cases provides clear guidance
for limiting off-campus speech, Internet speech, or speech directed at
21
the school or school personnel. As a result, a debate exists concerning

19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part II.B. This number does not include cases involving the censorship or
removal of books from a school’s library, such as Board of Education v. Pico. See, e.g., 457
U.S. 853 (1982).
21. Rather, the cases involved political expression at school, lewd and vulgar speech at a
school-sponsored event, student expression in a school-sponsored publication, and speech
seen as promoting drug use. See infra Part II.B. Although the majority did not view it as
such, Morse v. Frederick has been interpreted as involving suppression of off-campus student
speech. See, e.g., Klupinski, supra note 14, at 615 (“[A]lthough the Court avoided the issue of
whether schools can proscribe speech that originated off school property by deeming the
banner ‘school speech,’ the Morse decision helps expand a school’s authority to discipline
students for off-campus speech.”).
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how the “tests” created by the Court in the four-student speech cases
22
apply to student Internet expression. However, this Comment suggests
that the four Supreme Court cases are not as limited to their specific
facts as some suggest; rather, the Court’s underlying rationale for its
holding in each case can similarly be applied to student Internet
23
speech.
This Part addresses the origin of public education in the
United States, and then identifies the current role of public schools.
This Part then explains how the Court has carefully considered the
purpose of public education when analyzing the authority of public
schools to punish students for their speech.
A. Origin of Public Education and the Current Role of Public
Schools
Education is not a fundamental right provided by the United States
24
Constitution. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recognizes that it “is
25
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,”
26
playing “a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”

22. See, e.g., Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1027, 1090 (2008) (arguing that the Tinker standard cannot be applied to student
Internet speech “because it gives schools far too much authority to restrict juvenile speech
rights”); Joseph A. Tomain, Cyberspace Is Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: Offensive, Online
Student Speech Receives First Amendment Protection, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 97, 159 (2010)
(“Fraser does not create school jurisdiction over online speech—regardless of whether it is
created or accessed on or off campus—because there is no captive audience and no need for a
school to disassociate itself from the speech.”); Hoder, supra note 8, at 1594–95 (suggesting a
“control and supervision test to determine school jurisdiction over students’ online speech”);
Klupinski, supra note 14, at 647 (explaining how courts should think of student speech effect
and content as variables on a graph and analyze where these variables intersect to determine
if discipline was appropriate); Tuneski, supra note 6, at 142 (advocating for a bright-line rule
that eliminates Internet speech originating off-campus from school sanctions “unless the
speaker took additional, purposeful steps to ensure that the expression was disseminated at
school”).
23. See Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment
Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 689 [hereinafter Hafen, First Amendment Institutions]
(“These cases reason not from the premise that a school is a public forum for rational adults,
but from the opposite premise that young students must have unusual protection against
coercive influence on their beliefs precisely because they lack the rational capacity of
adults.”).
24. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).
25. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
26. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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As this section addresses, public schools are valued by society because
they teach not only fundamental academic skills that prepare students
for future careers and higher education, but also instill in students a
common set of core principles and values, such as respect, honesty,
citizenship, responsibility, and integrity, which are necessary for our
27
democratic nation to function.
After the American Revolution, education was perceived as a
necessary function to maintain and strengthen the country’s newly
28
formed system of self-government.
Leaders recognized that a
democratic society could be preserved only if its citizens were educated
29
to understand the principles and practices of self-governance. As a
result, public schools were established to teach students how to exercise
30
their democratic rights as citizens and cultivate a sense of nationalism.

27. See Michael A. Resnick, Public Education—An American Imperative: Why Public
Schools Are Vital to the Well-Being of Our Nation, POL’Y RES. BRIEF, Spring/Summer 2004,
at 3.
A democratic and free nation requires a people who value and practice certain
principles in their society. These principles include equality and freedom for all,
social mobility and meritocracy, equal opportunity and self-governance, and respect
for civil law and civic responsibility. Despite our nation’s size and diversity, the
American people have developed a shared vision and a common set of expectations
about what living in a democratic and free society means.
Id.
28. Susan H. Bitensky, A Contemporary Proposal for Reconciling the Free Speech Clause
with Curricular Values Inculcation in the Public Schools, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 769, 774
(1995). “[T]he attitude toward education after the American Revolution was that education
was necessary to ‘build nationalism, to shape the good citizen, and to reform society.’”
ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AMERICA GOES TO SCHOOL: LAW, REFORM, AND CRISIS IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION 70 (1995) (quoting JOEL SPRING, THE AMERICAN SCHOOL 1642–1990,
at 30 (2d ed. 1990)).
29. Bitensky, supra note 28, at 774–75; see GERALD L. GUTEK, EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 41–42 (1991) (explaining Thomas
Jefferson’s belief that the country would “degenerate into mob rule” unless a majority of
people received an education that emphasized civic virtues and responsibility); see also Bruce
C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority: Public Schools as
Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 675 (1987) [hereinafter Hafen, Developing Student
Expression] (“[E]ducation would create a needed sense of national unity, not only as a matter
of patriotic loyalty, but as a matter of common understanding and language, forged in the
egalitarian community of a public school inhabited by children of all classes and origins.”).
30. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“[S]ome degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.”); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always regarded education and
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Today, our nation’s schools are much more diverse than in the post31
revolutionary days. The increased diversity in student bodies has led to
conflicts between morality-based curriculum aimed at unifying the
nation and rights-based individualism, which naturally springs from the
32
multitude of racial, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds.
Because of
increased diversity, public schools have almost entirely eliminated
33
Modern public schools instead focus
morality-based curriculum.
predominately on preparing students for higher education and the
34
workforce; schools therefore emphasize skills acquisition in core
subjects such as literacy and mathematics, foster creative and analytical
35
thinking, and reinforce appropriate socialization skills. Nevertheless,
the public school is still regarded as a unique place where students are

acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently
promoted.”); Curtis G. Bentley, Student Speech in Public Schools: A Comprehensive
Analytical Framework Based on the Role of Public Schools in Democratic Education, 2009
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 23–24 (discussing Thomas Jefferson’s vision for education as a necessity
to sustain self-government). In order to foster democratic ideals through education, public
school curriculum originally was aimed at teaching moral, work, and political values. Michael
A. Rebell, Schools, Values, and the Courts, 7 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275, 280 (1989). Moral
values included honesty, generosity, charity, individualism, and self-reliance; work values
included discipline, self-control, industriousness, and obedience; and political values included
patriotism, democracy, and civic responsibility. Id.
31. See Rebell, supra note 30, at 283–84 (explaining that legal developments over the
past one hundred twenty years—such as compulsory education statutes and school
desegregation decrees—have diversified schools).
32. Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A
Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 108 (1996).
33. Id. at 108 (explaining that a major hurdle for achieving meaningful education reform
is the disintegration of the values consensus forged during the nineteenth century); see Rebell,
supra note 30, at 283–84 (discussing the dangers of inculcating a basic set of values in
contemporary schools that have changed drastically due to modern trends such as
urbanization, centralization, and individual rights assertion). The inculcative model of public
schools that dominated educational origins is opposed by critics who believe schools should
serve as a “marketplace of ideas” that allow student free expression and thought. See Kevin
G. Welner, Locking up the Marketplace of Ideas and Locking Out School Reform: Courts’
Imprudent Treatment of Controversial Teaching in American’s Public Schools, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 959, 966 (2003). A comprehensive discussion on the two opposing educational theories
is beyond the scope of this comment but is important to note.
34. Resnick, supra note 27, at 4–5 (noting that the goal of public schools shifted in the
1950s from “Americanizing a nation of immigrants and preparing an industrial workforce” to
preparing students for higher education).
35. VICTORIA J. DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 6–7 (2d ed. 2010).
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able to learn the principles and practices of a democratic society.
Although commentators disagree about the methods schools should
use to teach students, they generally agree that schools ought to teach
37
students certain values. A school environment is ideal for this purpose
because “[t]he hidden curriculum of the school has the potential to
teach important lessons about authority, responsibility, caring, and
38
39
respect.” In fact, “some inculcation of values in schools is inevitable.”
One critic of values inculcation in schools admits that “[i]t would be
both practically and theoretically impossible to completely prevent the
governmental values inculcation that occurs in the educational process;
in certain instances, values inculcation is an inherent by-product of the
educational process, and it would be absurd to hypothesize a vibrant
40
democratic society absent such a process.” Thus, even though the
methods may have changed, schools serve an important function in
teaching students “the civic knowledge, skills, and dispositions necessary

36. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 318–24 (1991) (describing three concepts of public education: civic
education, democratic education, and critical education).
37. See, e.g., Bentley, supra note 30, at 4 (arguing that schools should “inculcat[e] in
young students . . . the essential democratic values of nonrepression and nondiscrimination”);
Rebell, supra note 30, at 289–92 (suggesting that values inculcation should be based on values
important in a pluralistic society, which are discovered through participating in community
dialogues and looking to the courts when there are conflicts); Martin H. Redish & Kevin
Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today?: Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the
Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 69–72 (2002) (advocating that
values education should be based on an anti-indoctrination model, which conveys only those
values that are related to the educational process); Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech:
The Work of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1991)
(claiming that schools’ role in assisting students in development values should be based on a
conceptual-development model, rather than values inculcation model, to better develop
thinking skills).
38. Nat’l Council for the Soc. Studies, Fostering Civic Virtue: Character Education in the
Social Studies, 61 SOC. EDUC. 225, 226 (1997), available at http://www.socialstudies.org/positio
ns/character (“Teaching academic subjects and teaching character can be mutually reinforcing
tasks. Intellectual virtues such as patience, diligence, responsibility, reflectiveness, and
honesty are critical to the development of each student's academic potential. Thus, the
teaching of personal virtue is often a contribution to the development of civic virtue.”).
39. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 53 (1987) (“Even if schools avoid all
courses that deal explicitly with morality or civic education, they still engage in moral
education by virtue of their . . . noncurricular practices that serve to develop moral attitudes
and character in students.”); Welner, supra note 33, at 967.
40. Redish & Finnerty, supra note 37, at 69; see Nat’l Council for the Soc. Studies, supra
note 38, at 226.
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41

to participate in, preserve, and strengthen our republic.”
Education has changed a lot since the post-Revolutionary era, but it
is still viewed as an important vehicle through which young people learn
42
the values required to be responsible citizens. Even though the United
43
States Constitution does not refer to education, explicitly or implicitly,
each state acknowledges the fundamental role of education in its state
44
constitution.
For example, several state constitutions describe
education as necessary or essential to preserve the rights and liberties of
45
the people and the free government. In other states, the statutory
provisions that provide for free public education identify that the
purpose of education is, in part, to prepare individuals to be responsible,

41. GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS 8 (Jonathan Gould
ed., 2011) [hereinafter GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY], available at http://www.servicelearning.
org/library/resource/9617 (discussing the importance of civic education and proposing six
proven practices in civic learning).
42. See id. at 15–23 (explaining various benefits of civic learning); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
ADVANCING CIVIC LEARNING AND ENGAGEMENT IN DEMOCRACY: A ROAD MAP AND
CALL TO ACTION 2 (2012), available at http://www.ed.gov/sites/default/files/road-map-call-toaction.pdf (calling for an “infus[ion] and enhance[ment] [of] civic learning and democratic
engagement for all students throughout the American education system”).
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1, cl. a (“The education of children is a fundamental
value of the people of the State of Florida.”); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The stability of a
republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people . . . .”);
VA. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“[F]ree government rests, as does all progress, upon the broadest
possible diffusion of knowledge . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1 (“Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of
liberty and the bulwark of a free and good government . . . .”); IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1
(“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a community, being essential to the
preservation of a free government . . . .”); ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 (“A general
diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to the preservation of the rights and
liberties of the people . . . .”); MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. V, § 2 (“Wisdom, and knowledge, as
well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the
preservation of their rights and liberties . . . .”); MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“A general
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and
liberties of the people . . . .”); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (“Knowledge and learning, generally
diffused through a community, being essential to the preservation of a free
government . . . .”); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“A high degree of intelligence, patriotism,
integrity and morality on the part of every voter in a government by the people being
necessary in order to insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and
happiness of the people . . . .”); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“The diffusion of knowledge, as well
as of virtue among the people, being essential to the preservation of their rights and
liberties . . . .”); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge being essential
to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people . . . .”).
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active citizens by promoting both civic values and good character.
Indeed, states recognize the important goal of teaching their youth
47
the skills necessary to prepare students for college and careers, but
they also give public schools the responsibility of instilling in its students
48
the values of good character. To obtain these goals, school districts
recognize that the school environment plays a critical role in ensuring
49
that proper teaching and learning take place.
Therefore, in their
student handbooks and codes of conduct, several school districts have
identified student behaviors that are punishable, but they also focus on
50
promoting values that are required of responsible citizens.
For
example, in its Bill of Student Rights and Responsibilities, the New
York City Department of Education “promotes responsible student
behavior and an atmosphere of dignity and respect by establishing

46. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.015 (2010) (“It is the policy of this state that the
purpose of education is to help ensure that all students will succeed in their education and
work, shape worthwhile and satisfying lives for themselves, exemplify the best values of
society, and be effective in improving the character and quality of the world about them.”);
OR. REV. STAT. § 329.015 (2011) (focusing on education as “a major civilizing influence on
the development of a humane, responsible and informed citizenry . . . .”); TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 4.001 (West 2006) (explaining that the mission of the public education system is
“grounded on the conviction that a general diffusion of knowledge is essential for the welfare
of this state and for the preservation of the liberties and rights of citizens” with a goal to
“prepare students to be thoughtful, active citizens who have an appreciation for the basic
values of our state and national heritage and who can understand and productively function
in a free enterprise society”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1 (2004) (declaring that education is
necessary to maintain the state’s “constitutional form of government and its guarantees of
political and civil rights” as well as to “keep Vermont’s democracy competitive and
thriving”); WIS. STAT. § 118.01 (2009–2010) (requiring schools to teach students “[a]n
understanding of the basic workings of all levels of government, including the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship”).
47. See, e.g., L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., 2012–2015 STRATEGIC PLAN 3 [hereinafter
STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://home.lausd.net/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=17874
4&type=d&pREC_ID=407679 (stating that the school district’s vision includes having its
students “college-prepared and career-ready”).
48. See DODD, supra note 35, at 6–7; GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 41, at 15–
23.
49. See PATRICIA ANNE DUNCAN PARRISH, A WAKE UP CALL FOR SCHOOLS: A NEW
ORDER IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 39 (2010) ("Positive climate is the foundation for every
effective school."); see, e.g., STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 47, at 3 (“Our job is to create
conditions and environments for students to flourish and to build a culture of curiosity and a
community of life-long learners. Our vision is that every student will receive a quality
education in a safe, caring environment, and will be college-prepared and career-ready.”).
50. See, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., CITYWIDE STANDARDS OF INTERVENTION AND
DISCIPLINE MEASURES 1 (2012) [hereinafter N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC.].
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guidelines to help students as they strive to become productive citizens
51
in a diverse society.” As another example, Miami-Dade County Public
Schools established a set of core values as essential to its commitment to
helping students learn how “to participate as caring, responsible citizens
52
in our nation’s democracy.”
From the beginning, education has been vital to preserving our
53
nation. Because the principles associated with democracy—such as
respect, honesty, citizenship, responsibility, and integrity—are not
54
inherent, public schools are given the responsibility of promoting them.
55
All levels of government recognize this important responsibility. As
the next section explains, the Supreme Court also recognizes this goal of
public schools.
B. Supreme Court Promotes the Educational Mission Through Student
Speech Cases
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the public
school plays a dominant role in maintaining our democratic society. For
example, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court described
education as “the very foundation of good citizenship . . . [and] a
56
principle instrument in awakening the child to cultural values[.]”
Similarly, the Court declared in Ambach v. Norwick that an imperative
function of public schools is to prepare persons for citizenship and to
57
preserve values. Since 1969, the Supreme Court has addressed four
58
cases concerning students’ right to free speech within a public school.
In these cases, the Court identified the scope of the constitutional
51. Id.
52. MIAMI-DADE CNTY. PUB. SCH., CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT: SECONDARY 4
(2007–2008). The values include citizenship, cooperation, fairness, honesty, integrity,
kindness, pursuit of excellence, respect, and responsibility. Id.
53. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. See generally Resnick, supra note 27.
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.”); see supra notes 42, 44–45 and
accompanying text; see, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 50, at 1.
56. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
57. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (“The importance of public schools in
the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the
values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions.”).
58. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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protection for student speech in light of the school’s role.
The first case the Supreme Court heard concerning student speech
59
was Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. In
that case, three students wore black armbands to school to represent
60
their objections to the Vietnam War. The students were sent home
from school after refusing to remove the armbands and suspended until
61
they agreed to return without them. Proclaiming that neither teachers
nor students “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
62
expression at the schoolhouse gate,” the Court held that the silent
protest of the students was protected speech, and the actions taken by
63
the school violated the Constitution.
In coming to its decision, the Court identified two colliding interests:
the free exercise of students’ First Amendment rights and the authority
64
of the schools to control conduct within the school. The Court quoted
Justice Jackson, who explained: “That [schools] are educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
65
government as mere platitudes.” Yet, the Court identified the “special
66
characteristics of the school environment” and the school’s authority to
67
control student conduct.
To ensure that students are allowed to express their opinions at
school, while reaffirming the school’s ability to control conduct, the
Court explained that a student’s right to speech and expression may not
be regulated unless there is a showing that the speech or expression
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
68
invasion of the rights of others . . . .” Read broadly, Tinker established

59. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
60. Id. at 504.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 506.
63. Id. at 514. The Court noted that suspending the students for armbands implicated
“direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to ‘pure speech.’” Id. at 508.
64. Id. at 507.
65. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
66. Id. at 506.
67. See id. at 507 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”).
68. Id. at 513.
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a presumption that student speech or expression in school is
constitutionally protected unless the school can reasonably show that
the speech or expression caused—or will cause—a material disruption
69
or invasion of rights.
The Supreme Court heard its second student speech case—Bethel
70
School District No. 403 v. Fraser—seventeen years after Tinker.
Matthew Fraser, a high school student, was suspended from school for
three days and his name was removed from a list of candidates to speak
at commencement because he gave a “lewd” speech at a school71
sponsored assembly.
The speech elicited a response from several
students but did not cause any delays to the assembly program nor did it
72
cause any other disruptions at school. Nevertheless, the school district
maintained—and the Supreme Court agreed—that the school could
punish Fraser because the school had an interest in protecting its
73
students from lewd and offensive speech.
The Court, in reversing the decision of the district court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, noted the distinction between the
political expression in Tinker—the “nondisruptive, passive expression of
a political viewpoint”—and the lewd, sexual content of the speech in
74
Fraser. The Court explained that an important objective of public
69. Hafen, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 689. But see Bentley, supra
note 30, at 7–8 (providing examples of narrow interpretations of Tinker); Josh Davis & Josh
Rosenberg, Government as Patron or Regulator in the Student Speech Cases, 83 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 1047, 1072 n.149 (2009) (discussing the different interpretations of the Tinker rule).
70. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
71. Id. at 677–78. The lewd speech was a nomination of a fellow student for student
office in which Matthew Fraser referred to the candidate in terms of a sexual metaphor:
I know a man who is firm—he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character
is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts—he drives hard,
pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very
end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B.
vice-president—he'll never come between you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
72. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478
U.S. 675 (1986).
73. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680; see ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE
UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 43 (2009).
74. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying the Tinker
standard, found that the speech was protected because it did not disrupt school activities.
Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1360 (“In our view, a noisy response to the speech and sexually suggestive
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school education is the teaching of “habits and manners of civility,”
including tolerance of speech that expresses opposing or controversial
75
ideas. However, a school need not tolerate speech that “undermine[s]
76
the school’s basic educational mission,” such as speech that is lewd and
77
vulgar.
The Court’s holding in Fraser did not overrule Tinker; rather, it
78
“established that [Tinker’s] mode of analysis . . . is not absolute.” The
decision demonstrates that public school students do not have the same
79
First Amendment protections as adults in other settings. Moreover,
the decision reflects the Court’s faith in public schools to decide how to
teach students to “demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse
and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of
80
class.” As such, the Court established a balancing test: weighing the
students’ freedom to express unpopular opinions against society’s
81
interest of ensuring that students learn appropriate behaviors. As one
commentator observed, the Court “believed that high school students
could only learn about democratic values in a more disciplined
atmosphere. If they are able to learn these values while they are in

movements by three students in a crowd of 600 fail to rise to the level of a material
interference with the educational process that justifies impinging upon Fraser's First
Amendment right to express himself freely.”).
75. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE
BEARDS’ NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
76. Id. at 685.
77. Id. at 685–86.
78. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007); see DUPRE, supra note 73, at 49; Hafen,
First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 690–91 (describing the Fraser decision as a
“significant departure” from the material or substantial disruption test articulated in Tinker).
79. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (citation omitted). In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
noted:
It is true, however, that the State has interests in teaching high school students how
to conduct civil and effective public discourse and in avoiding disruption of
educational school activities.
Thus, the Court holds that under certain
circumstances, high school students may properly be reprimanded for giving a
speech at a high school assembly which school officials conclude disrupted the
school’s educational mission. Respondent’s speech may well have been protected
had he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school’s
legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less
weighty.
Id. at 688–98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 683 (majority opinion).
81. Id. at 681.
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school, they will be better able to understand their importance to the
82
self-preservation of the nation when they become adults.”
The Court’s holding in Fraser has caused significant confusion
83
among courts and commentators alike. Read narrowly and literally,
Fraser stands for an exception to Tinker’s material disruption analysis: a
school may regulate speech in classrooms or at school-sponsored events
84
if it is lewd, vulgar, or obscene—no disruption is needed. However,
Fraser has also been interpreted more broadly as recognizing that it is
within the school’s discretion to regulate student speech if the school
finds that the speech is “inconsistent with its ‘basic educational
85
mission.’”
Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court formulated another
“test” in its third student speech case, Hazelwood School District v.
86
Kuhlmeier.
In this case, the school principal omitted two articles
87
written by student-staff members of the school newspaper. One article,
featuring three students’ experiences with pregnancy, was removed
because the principal was concerned that the identities of the girls in the
88
article would become known. The principal also believed that “the
82. DUPRE, supra note 73, at 49.
83. See Davis & Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 1074–75 & n.161 (explaining that Fraser
confused Tinker’s already ambiguous holding and has left many questions unanswered);
Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student
Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 839 (2008) (“Fraser did not, however, explicitly
hold that it was altering or adding to Tinker’s inquiry.”); see also Bitensky, supra note 28, at
814 (noting that the Fraser decision answers whether schools may regulate speech to instill
nonpolitical values but it also created ambiguity and left many questions unanswered). An
analysis of the extent of confusion is beyond the scope of this comment. For purposes of this
comment, it is sufficient to understand the two dominant approaches to Fraser.
84. See Tomain, supra note 22, at 104 (“Fraser holds that three factors are important for
schools to assert jurisdiction over student speech: (1) there must be a captive audience; (2) the
speech must involve lewd or indecent sexual content; and (3) the school must have a need to
disassociate itself from the speech.”).
85. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Fraser, 478
U.S. at 685); see Bentley, supra note 30, at 9 (noting that, despite ultimately being decided
based on the speech’s vulgarity, “the opinion contained numerous statements by the Court
regarding the appropriateness of deferring to educational authorities in matters relating to
the educational mission of schools”); Hafen, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at
691 (“Fraser rested on a more substantial foundation than the vulgarity of the student
speaker’s language . . . .”).
86. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73.
87. Id. at 263.
88. Id. The story used false names, but the principal was concerned that they may
nonetheless be identified from the text. Id.
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article’s references to sexual activity and birth control were
89
inappropriate for some of the younger students.” The other article
removed from the newspaper discussed students’ experiences with
90
The principal removed that article because he
parental divorce.
thought the parents identified in the article should have been given an
opportunity to respond to the remarks about them or to consent to
91
publication. The students contended that by omitting two articles from
the school newspaper, the school violated their First Amendment
92
rights.
Like Tinker and Fraser, the decision in Hazelwood was based upon
balancing the First Amendment rights of students against the
educational mission of the public school. The Court accepted that the
principal’s decision to delete the articles was a reasonable one, and
therefore it found no violation of the students’ First Amendment
93
rights. In doing so, the Court rejected the idea that a school-sponsored
newspaper was a public forum open to “indiscriminate use” by the
students because the newspaper was intended to be a learning
94
experience.
More importantly, the Court differentiated students’
personal expression from expression that the “public might reasonably
95
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”
Focusing again on the role of educators as imparting knowledge
96
about cultural values as well as traditional academia, the Court in

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 264.
93. Id. at 276.
94. Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 271 (“Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second form
of student expression to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is
designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not
erroneously attributed to the school.”). As one commentator observed,
[The majority opinion] pointed out that in Tinker the Court addressed whether a
school was required to tolerate student speech—a matter of the student’s personal
expression. In Hazelwood, the question was whether the school was required
affirmatively to promote particular student speech that occurred in activities the
school sponsored, like newspaper publications, theater productions, and other
expressive activities.
DUPRE, supra note 73, at 89.
96. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
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Hazelwood concluded that schools may censor student publications that
97
are reasonably related to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.” The court
suggested that if schools were unable to disassociate themselves from
certain student speech, they “would be unduly constrained from
fulfilling their role as ‘principal instrument[s] in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
98
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.’”
Like Tinker and Fraser, Hazelwood has been interpreted in several
99
ways. However, the standard most often attributed to the Hazelwood
decision is that schools have discretion in regulating school-sponsored
speech that takes place in a school-sponsored forum if the regulation
100
reasonably relates to the school’s educational mission.
The final student speech case heard by the Supreme Court was
101
Morse v. Frederick.
In Morse, the school permitted its students to
observe the Olympic Torch Relay, which passed through the town along
102
a street in front of the school. Students viewed the relay from either
103
side of the street, off school grounds. Joseph Frederick, who had been
late to school that day, joined his friends on the street across from the
school and unfolded a banner bearing the phrase “BONG HiTS 4
104
JESUS” as the torch bearers and camera crews passed by. Frederick
refused to take down the banner until the principal confiscated it, and
105
he was suspended from school for ten days. The Court declared that
(1954)).
97. Id. at 272–73.
98. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (1954)); see Hafen, First Amendment
Institutions, supra note 23, at 685 (suggesting that Hazelwood actually strengthens rather than
weakens students’ First Amendment protections because it recognizes schools as tools to help
students “develop their own educated capacity for self-expression”).
99. See Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core: A New Approach to
Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63, 90 (2008) (identifying that
different circuit courts are reaching different conclusions about the boundaries of Hazelwood
in relation to viewpoint related restrictions and the rationales used when applying the case to
decide student-speech issues).
100. See, e.g., Hafen, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 693–94; Adam K.
Nalley, Note, Did Student Speech Get Thrown Out with the Banner? Reading “Bong Hits 4
Jesus” Narrowly to Uphold Important Constitutional Protections for Students, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 615, 640 (2009).
101. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
102. Id. at 397.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 398.

14 SULLIVAN (DO NOT DELETE)

708

3/6/2013 9:32 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:689
106

the “special circumstances of the school environment” combined with
the governmental interests to prevent drug abuse gives schools
107
discretion to regulate speech that promotes drug use. Thus, the Court
concluded that Frederick’s expression was not protected speech because
it could reasonably be viewed as promoting illegal drug use during a
108
school-sponsored event.
The Court’s decision in Morse has been viewed by commentators as
a constitutional dead end—that it applies only when schools censor
109
speech that can be “reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”
However, lower courts have construed the opinion to be about the
110
schools’ concerns for the health and safety of its students.
The case
has also been viewed as expanding a school’s authority to discipline
111
student speech that occurs off-campus.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in each of the four student speech
cases appear to impart a rather narrow test specific to the particular
facts. Nonetheless, the Court’s underlying analysis, which considers the
school’s educational mission, has remained consistent when determining
the constitutionality of student speech regulation. Critics of the Court’s
decisions argue that limiting student speech in schools—when it could
not be limited if otherwise not in a school setting—is wholly contrary to
the school’s democratic mission and our country’s commitment to the
112
exercise of the First Amendment.
106. Id. at 408 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 410.
109. Id. at 403; see Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower
Courts: Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2008) (discussing why the Court’s holding “was perceived as being
constricted and limited by both its quirky, if not unique, set of facts about the display of a
banner conveying the message ‘Bong Hits 4 Jesus’”).
110. See Calvert, supra note 109, at 12–21 (analyzing how Morse has been applied by
lower courts to support suppression of violent and homophobic speech in schools).
111. See, e.g., Klupinski, supra note 14, at 615 (“[A]lthough the Court avoided the issue
of whether schools can proscribe speech that originated off school property by deeming the
banner ‘school speech,’ the Morse decision helps expand a school’s authority to discipline
students for off-campus speech.”)
112. See DUPRE, supra note 73, at 2 (illustrating the “paradox” of school speech); see
also Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The ‘educational mission’ argument
would give public school authorities a license to suppress speech on political and social issues
based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed. The argument, therefore, strikes at the
very heart of the First Amendment.”).
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However, other commentators and the Court have attempted to
dispel this argument by discussing the “special characteristics of the
113
school environment.” For instance, the Court acknowledged that even
though students do not lose their constitutional rights while they are at
114
school, their rights while at school “are not automatically coextensive
115
with the rights of adults in other settings.” The Court cited reasons for
this unique treatment of public school children such as the maturity
116
levels of the students and the necessity of teachers to be able to
control the conduct of their students in order to effectively impart
117
knowledge.
Furthermore, limiting student expression in schools may actually
assist students in understanding their democratic rights more than if
118
children in schools were free to express whatever they desired. As one
commentator has observed, because children have a diminished capacity
to make meaningful decisions—a fact that has been implicated in
decisions such as the establishment of a minimum voting age of eighteen
and prohibition of prayer in public schools—they do not have the
119
capacity to meaningfully express themselves. Until they develop this
120
capacity, any restraint on their expression is limited in value.
Thus,
appropriate restraint on student speech can effectively promote rather
than contradict important democratic values that are necessary to
prepare students to become effective citizens in society.
However, the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding student speech
arguably have caused more confusion than guidance for schools dealing
with student speech issues. Lower courts have attempted to apply the
four principles generated from the decisions to student speech cases
113.
114.
115.
116.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 506. (1969).
Id.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (citation omitted).
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at

683.
117. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
118. See Hafen, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 23, at 699–700 (arguing that the
long held belief of minimal intervention in student expression does not enhance children’s
“most fundamental interest in first amendment values”).
119. See id. (“Until children have developed this freedom ‘for expression,’ their freedom
‘from restrains on expression’ has only limited value.” (quoting Hafen, Developing Student
Expression, supra note 29, at 666)).
120. Id. at 700; see also Bentley, supra note 30, at 31 (suggesting that when children are
simply left without guidance and hierarchical instruction, they are unable to choose the
fundamental democratic values because they lack adequate moral reasoning).
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121

with significantly different fact scenarios.
The result has been an
122
aggregate of differing interpretations.
One of the more difficult
student speech scenarios the lower courts have grappled with is student
speech on the Internet that originated off-campus and involves the
123
school or school personnel.
The Supreme Court cases have not
examined student speech that occurs off-campus, speech that exists on
the Internet, or speech that is directed at the school or school officials.
The next Part examines these lower court decisions more in depth.
III. LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF PRECEDENT TO ONLINE
SPEECH
Student speech cases seem to involve a sort of balancing approach:
balancing a school’s interests in maintaining order and fulfilling its role
as an educational institution with the student’s right to freedom of
124
expression.
Even before the use of the Internet, lower courts
struggled with determining where the balance tipped when schools
disciplined students for off-campus expression directed at school and
125
school authorities. Although the location of the speech as either offcampus or on-campus was relatively easy to determine—a decision
based on the geographic location of where the student created the
expression—courts were left unguided when off-campus expression was
126
brought on school grounds.
The use of the Internet for student
expression has only muddled the issue further, as shown by the
inconsistencies in lower court decisions. Below are examples of lower
court decisions where students created expression on the Internet and
the various standards the lower courts have applied to decide them.

121. See discussion infra Part III.
122. See discussion infra Part III.
123. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
124. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
125. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (Snyder II), 650 F.3d 915, 937
(3rd. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Smith, J., concurring) (“Lower courts . . . are divided on whether
Tinker’s substantial-disruption test governs students’ off-campus expression.”); supra note 81
and accompanying text.
126. Compare, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that the school exceeded its authority by disciplining students for distributing
satirical newsletter created off-campus), with Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir.
1998) (upholding school’s authority to punish a student who published an underground
newsletter describing how to hack into the school’s computers).
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A. Internet Speech Originating Off-Campus: Cases Favorable for the
School
Without a Supreme Court ruling on how to handle student
expression on the Internet, some courts have underscored the Court’s
emphasis on the educational mission of the schools to determine the
127
constitutionality of disciplining student Internet speech. For example,
in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School District, an eighth-grader
128
created a website on his home computer entitled “Teacher Sux.” The
website contained several web pages of offensive comments and images
129
about the principal and some of the teachers at the student’s school.
Other students at school viewed the website, and eventually a
teacher at the middle school learned of the website and reported it to
130
the principal. Interpreting the website as containing a serious threat to
the school, the principal contacted the local police and the Federal
131
Bureau of Investigation to identify the creator of the website.
Mrs.
Fulmer developed numerous psychological symptoms as a result of
feeling threatened and was granted a medical leave of absence, which
132
required the school to hire three substitute teachers. The website even
caused a “demoralizing impact on the school community,” which the
court described as comparable to the death of a student or staff
133
member.
After the School Board voted to expel J.S. for statements he made
on the website, J.S. argued that his First Amendment rights were
134
violated by the School District. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
127. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847.
128. Id. at 850–51.
129. Id. at 851. The website was particularly aimed at J.S.’s algebra teacher, Mrs.
Fulmer. Id. For example, the site contained a web page titled “Why Should [Mrs. Fulmer]
Die?” and elicited $20 from readers to help pay for a hitman. Id. On his site, J.S. depicted
Mrs. Fulmer as Adolf Hitler, included a drawing of Mrs. Fulmer’s head severed from her
body, and repeated 136 times “F____ You Mrs. Fulmer. You are a B____. You Are A Stupid
B____.” Id. Additionally, the website expressed that the school’s principal was having sexual
relations with a principal from another school. Id.
130. Id. at 851–52. Even though there was a disclaimer on the website stating that by
clicking on it and entering the website the visitor agrees that he is not employed by the school
district and will not tell any school district employees about the website, anyone was able to
access the website. Id. at 851.
131. Id. at 852.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 853.
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affirmed both the trial court’s and the Commonwealth Court’s decisions
135
to uphold the Board’s decision to expel him. Deciding first whether
the speech was considered to be on or off-campus speech, the court
found that a sufficient nexus existed between the website and the school
136
campus to characterize the speech as an on-campus expression. The
court acknowledged that the website was created off-campus, but held
that it was on-campus speech because it was aimed at the school and
137
school personnel and was accessed at school by J.S.
After determining that the speech was indeed on-campus, the court
recognized that the facts of the case made applying any of the Supreme
138
Court precedents for analyzing student speech difficult.
The court,
however, in focusing on “the unique needs of the school setting and
139
concern for the school’s education mission,” applied a combination of
140
Because the language on the website was “lewd,
Tinker and Fraser.
141
vulgar, and plainly offensive,” it undermined the school’s basic
142
educational mission.
Further, because schools must control conduct
within the school environment, the disruption that the website caused
within the school was substantial enough for the school to discipline J.S.
143
for the content of the website.
Courts have also determined the constitutionality of disciplining
Internet speech by examining the likelihood that the speech would reach
campus and cause a material or substantial disruption in the learning
144
environment. In Wisniewski v. Board of Education, an eighth-grade
student created an instant messaging icon on his parents’ computer that
145
identified him when he messaged his “buddies” on AOL.
The icon
135. Id. at 869.
136. Id. at 865.
137. Id. “We hold that where speech that is aimed at a specific school and/or its
personnel is brought onto the school campus or accessed at school by its originator, the
speech will be considered on-campus speech.” Id.
138. See id. at 865–66 (explaining why Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood do not provide
adequate guidelines to determine whether J.S.’s speech is protected).
139. Id. at 868.
140. Id. at 866 (“In essence, the type of speech at issue in this case straddles the political
speech in Tinker, and the lewd and offensive speech expressed at an official school assembly
in Fraser.”).
141. Id. at 868.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 868–69.
144. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
145. Id. at 35.
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was a depiction of a person’s head being shot by a pistol, with the words
146
147
“Kill Mr. VanderMolen” beneath it.
A classmate of Wisniewski
informed Mr. VanderMolen of the depiction and brought a copy of the
148
icon to school to show him. Wisniewski was originally suspended for
149
five days, but after a superintendent’s meeting, his suspension was
150
increased to the entire first semester of the school year.
The court declined to analyze the facts of the case under a “true
151
threat” analysis.
Rather, applying Tinker, the court held that the
speech was not protected because the school reasonably predicted that
152
the icon would create a risk of material or substantial disruption.
Even though Wisniewski created the icon on his home computer and did
not intend for the icon to come to the attention of the school, the
threatening nature of the icon and the distribution of it to at least fifteen
classmates created a foreseeable risk that the icon would be made
153
known to the school and would cause a disruption therein. The court
emphasized its view that conduct that reasonably causes a foreseeable
risk of disruption within the school—regardless of intent or origin—can
154
be disciplined by the school.
Courts have also upheld schools’ decisions to punish students for
speech causing disruption to the activities of school administrators. For
example, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit upheld a school’s
155
decision to discipline a student for her speech on the Internet. Avery
Doninger, a high school junior, was a member of Student Council and

146. Mr. VanderMolen was Wisniewski’s teacher at the time. Id. at 36.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 37.
151. Id. at 37–38. A true threat analysis requires a court to determine “whether a
reasonable person would interpret the purported threat as a serious expression of an intent to
cause a present or future harm.” Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622
(8th Cir. 2002). See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (recognizing that
threats of violence are not protected by the First Amendment). The Wisniewski Court noted
that despite the practice of other courts to assess a student’s statements concerning killing
school officials against the “true ‘threat’” standard, it believed that the school had “broader
authority to sanction student speech” than allowed under a true threat analysis. Wisniewski,
494 F.3d at 38.
152. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38–39.
153. Id. at 39–40.
154. Id. at 40.
155. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2008).

14 SULLIVAN (DO NOT DELETE)

714

3/6/2013 9:32 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:689

156

served as the Junior Class Secretary. While attempting to finalize the
scheduling of an annual event—Jamfest—Doninger and other members
of the student council sent out an email to the broader community
asking for help to persuade the district superintendent to hold Jamfest
157
on the date and at the location they wanted. The superintendent and
the school’s principal received “an influx of telephone calls and emails”
from the email recipients who were concerned about the scheduling of
158
the event. The principal expressed her disappointment in Doninger,
and—according to Doninger—told her that Jamfest was going to be
159
cancelled altogether.
Later that evening, Doninger published her frustrations on her
160
public blog on livejournal.com:
[J]amfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. [H]ere
is an email that we sent to a ton of people and asked them to
forward to everyone in their address book to help get support for
jamfest. [B]asically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is
getting a TON of phone calls and emails and such. [W]e have so
much support and we really appriciate [sic] it. [H]owever, she
got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole thing all
together. [A]nddd [sic] so basically we aren’t going to have it at
all, but in the slightest chance we do it is going to be after the
talent show on [M]ay 18th. [A]ndd [sic] here is the letter we sent
out to parents.
....
And here is a letter my mom sent to Paula [Schwartz] and cc’d
Karissa [Niehoff] to get an idea of what to write if you want to
161
write something or call her to piss her off more. [I’m] down.
The principal and superintendent each received more phone calls
156. Id. at 44.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 44–45. Doninger claimed that the school’s principal told her the event was
cancelled; however, the district court gave credit to the principal’s testimony, claiming she
never told Doninger that the event was cancelled. Id.
160. Id. at 45. Livejournal.com is a “community publishing platform” where users are
able to blog as well as network with one another. See Our Company, LIVEJOURNAL,
http://www.livejournalinc.com/aboutus.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).
161. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45. The post also contained copies of the email that the
Student Council members sent earlier that day as well as a copy of the email Doninger’s
mother had wrote to the superintendent concerning the conflict. Id.
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162

and emails concerning Jamfest the next day at school.
The school’s
principal decided that Doninger’s conduct was inconsistent with the
“civility and good citizenship expected of class officers,” and she
163
prohibited Doninger from running for Senior Class Secretary.
164
The Second Circuit Court applied the Tinker standard —rejecting
the Fraser exception because the blog was written off school
165
grounds —and concluded that the school did not violate Doninger’s
First Amendment rights by disqualifying her from running for Senior
166
The court used the framework developed in its
Class Secretary.
167
decision in Wisniewski to conclude that although she created the blog
168
post off-campus, Doninger meant for it to reach school grounds.
Further, the court found that the post created a reasonably foreseeable
169
risk of substantial disruption in the school.
Three factors the court
focused on in coming to its conclusion were (1) the language Doninger
used in her post requesting her readers to call the principal and
superintendant was “disruptive of efforts to resolve the ongoing
170
controversy,” (2) the misleading—if not false—information Doninger
used claiming that Jamfest had been cancelled altogether caused
frustration in the school community and was likely to cause more
171
disruption to the school administrators and teachers, and (3) the
discipline was appropriate since it related to Doninger’s role as a
172
member of student council.
Finally, at least one court has analyzed a student speech case without
referring to any of the Supreme Court precedents. In Barnett ex rel.

162. Id. at 46.
163. Id. Doninger was not permitted to be on the ballot or to campaign for Senior Class
Secretary, yet she received a plurality of the votes as a write-in candidate. Id. However, she
was not permitted to accept the nomination for office. Id.
164. Id. at 50.
165. See id. at 49 (“To be clear, Fraser does not justify restricting a student’s speech
merely because it is inconsistent with an educator’s sensibilities . . . . [H]ad it occurred in the
classroom, [Doninger’s speech] would have fallen within Fraser and its recognition that
nothing in the First Amendment prohibits school authorities from discouraging inappropriate
language in the school environment.”).
166. Id. at 53.
167. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
168. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 50.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 50–51.
171. Id. at 51.
172. Id. at 52.
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173

Barnett v. Tipton County Board of Education, two high school students
were disciplined for creating fake MySpace profiles of the assistant
174
principal and a coach of the high school. The profile of the assistant
principal, which contained sexually suggestive comments directed
towards female students, was brought to the school’s attention by a
concerned parent and a local reporter who both believed the profile to
175
be authentic. In holding that the school did not violate the students’
First Amendment rights, the court did not analyze the case under Tinker
176
or any of the other Supreme Court cases; rather, the court held that
the speech in the profiles was not protected by the First Amendment
177
because the profiles were not parodies.
The court further denied
allegations that the school violated the students’ due process rights
178
Thus, similar to Wisniewski,
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Doninger, and J.S., the Barnett court affirmed the state’s interest in
deterring speech that poses a risk for substantial disruption in favor of
the school’s interest in furthering its educational mission.
B. Internet Speech Originating Off-Campus: Cases Favorable for the
Students
Conversely, some courts have held in favor of protecting student
speech. Often, when a court holds that a school violated a student’s free
expression rights by punishing the student for content on the Internet,
the court will find that the Internet expression—unless constituting a
threat—did not create a reasonably foreseeable risk of substantial
179
disruption within a school. In Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland
180
R-IV School District, for example, Brandon Beussink was disciplined
173. Barnett ex rel. Barnett v. Tipton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 601 F. Supp. 2d. 980 (W.D.
Tenn. 2009).
174. Id. at 982–83.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 984.
177. Id. Parodies are protected by the First Amendment if they “involve speech that
cannot ‘reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [the subject of the
parody].’” Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988)).
178. Barnett, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 985.
179. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216, 219
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); Snyder II, 650 F.3d 915, 930–31
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010);
Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (E.D. Mo.
1998).
180. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175.
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for creating a webpage that criticized the school, the principals, and the
181
teachers. The webpage contained “vulgar language” used to criticize
the school and invited readers to contact the school to voice their
concerns—though there is no evidence that anyone actually contacted
182
the school.
The court used Tinker’s material and substantial disruption test to
decide whether the school was justified in limiting the student’s
183
speech. It balanced the harm to Beussink if his discipline was upheld
against the harm to the school if the discipline was found to be in
184
violation of Beussink’s rights.
The court found that the school
violated Beussink’s free speech rights because the website caused no
185
actual or reasonable fear of substantial disruption to the school.
Additionally, the court defined the speech as an unpopular opinion and
identified it as the type of speech that the First Amendment was
186
designed to protect.
Similar to the analysis in Beussink was the court’s analysis in Evans
187
v. Bayer. In this case, Katherine Evans was a high school senior who
created a group on Facebook entitled, “Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst
teacher I’ve ever met,” as a place for her and other students to “express
188
[their] feelings of hatred” for the teacher.
Evans created the group
page on her home computer and removed it after two days, but she was
nevertheless disciplined by the school principal after he became aware
189
of the page.
190
In holding that the school violated Evans’ First Amendment rights,
the court first recognized that off-campus speech could “raise[] on-

181. Id. at 1177–78.
182. Id. at 1177.
183. Id. at 1180; see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969).
184. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1182. The court explained that the school principal disciplined Beussink
because the content of the webpage upset him, rather than for fear that the speech would
cause a disturbance to the school environment. Id. at 1180.
187. Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
188. Id. at 1367. The webpage contained Phelps’ picture, and only three postings, all in
support of Phelps, appeared on the page from other students. Id. Phelps never saw the
webpage. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1376–77.

14 SULLIVAN (DO NOT DELETE)

718

3/6/2013 9:32 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:689

191

campus concerns.”
Although the off-campus speech in this instance
was aimed at the school, the court held that the direction of the speech
192
was not, by itself, sufficient to define the speech as on-campus.
Further, the court explained that the speech was protected because “[i]t
was an opinion of a student about a teacher, that was published offcampus, did not cause any disruption on-campus, and was not lewd,
193
vulgar, threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous behavior.” As
a result, absent a showing of a foreseeable threat of disruption, the court
refused to allow regulation of student Internet speech simply because
the target audience was in whole or in part on-campus.
Recently, the Third Circuit decided two similar cases en banc. In J.S.
194
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, eighth-graders J.S. and
her friend, K.L., created a fake MySpace profile of their principal, Mr.
195
McGonigle, using J.S.’s home computer. The profile did not include
McGonigle’s real name, school, or location, but instead characterized
him as a bi-sexual forty-year-old middle school principal named “m196
hoe=]” who lived in Alabama with his wife and child. The profile did
feature his photograph, which was copied and pasted from the school
197
district’s website. In the “Interests” section of the webpage, the girls
198
included things such as “being a tight ass,” “riding the fraintrain
199
200
[sic],” and “hitting on students and their parents.” Additionally, the
“About Me” section of the webpage read:
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. [I]t’s your oh so wonderful, hairy,
expressionless, sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small
dick PRINCIPAL[.] I have come to [MySpace] so I can pervert
191. Id. at 1370.
192. See id. at 1371.
193. Id. at 1374.
194. Snyder II, 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011) (en banc).
195. Id. at 920. The profile’s URL was http://www.myspace.com/kidsrockmybed. J.S. ex
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. (Snyder I), 593 F.3d 286, 291 (3rd Cir. 2010), vacated,
reh’g granted en banc, 650 F.3d 915 (3rd Cir. 2011).
196. Snyder I, 593 F.3d at 291 (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting 2 Appendix on Behalf of Appellants at A38, Snyder I, 593 F.3d. 286
(3rd Cir. 2010) (No. 08-4138)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Id. (quoting 2 Appendix on Behalf of Appellants, supra note 198, at A38) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Debra Frain is Mr. McGonigle’s wife and one of the school’s
guidance counselors. Id. at 291 n.2.
200. Id. at 291 (quoting 2 Appendix on Behalf of Appellants, supra note 198, at A38)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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the minds of other principal’s [sic] to be just like me. I know, I
know, you’re all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to [MySpace]
is because—I am keeping an eye on you students (who[m] I care
for so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t
in my school[,] I love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks
on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my
darling wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs) MY
FRAINTRAIN[.] [S]o please, feel free to add me, message me
201
whatever[.]
Originally appearing as a “public” profile, “M-hoe’s” profile page
was made “private” by J.S. after several students approached her at
202
school on the day after the page was created. No students viewed the
profile while at school—Blue Mountain School District blocked
computer access to MySpace—but access was granted to about twentytwo students who attended school in the district after requesting
203
“friend” status. When Mr. McGonigle learned about the profile page
204
and its creator, he showed it to the school district’s superintendent and
205
He
the Director of Technology, as well as two guidance counselors.
eventually punished J.S. and K.L. with ten days out-of-school
206
suspension. Further, Mr. McGonigle contacted MySpace, Inc., to have
the profile removed, and he called the local police station to inquire
207
about whether he could take personal legal action.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that the
school violated J.S.’s First Amendment free speech rights by punishing
208
her for creating the profile of Mr. McGonigle.
Rejecting the
209
applicability of Fraser to the case, the court applied the Tinker analysis

201. Snyder II, 650 F.3d 915, 921 (3rd. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (alterations in original)
(quoting 2 Appendix on Behalf of Appellants at A38, Snyder II, 650 F.3d. 915 (3rd Cir. 2011)
(No. 08-4138)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. (explaining that Mr. McGonigle learned about the profile from another student
and asked the student to bring him a printout of the profile page).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 922.
207. Snyder I, 593 F.3d 286, 293 (3rd Cir. 2010), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 650 F.3d
915 (3rd Cir. 2011).
208. Snyder II, 650 F.3d at 931.
209. See id. at 932 (“Fraser’s ‘lewdness’ standard cannot be extended to justify a school’s
punishment of J.S. for use of profane language outside the school, during non-school hours.”).
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when deciding that the “School District could [not] have reasonably
forecasted a substantial disruption of or material interference with the
210
school as a result of J.S.’s profile.”
The court explained that the
profile could not be seen as potentially causing a substantial or material
disruption because it was created as a joke and “was so outrageous that
211
no one could have taken it seriously, and no one did.” Although the
profile contained vulgar language, the court characterized the content as
so “juvenile” that no one in the school community who might see the
profile would suspect that Mr. McGonigle actually possessed the type of
212
character described in the profile.
Furthermore, the court also
considered in its decision the fact that J.S. made the profile “private,”
213
inferring that she never intended for the page to reach school grounds.
The second of the two en banc rulings issued by the Third Circuit on
the same day was Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School
214
District. Justin Layshock, a senior at Hickory High School, created a
215
fake profile of his principal, Mr. Trosch, on MySpace. Similar to J.S.,
Layshock created the profile during non-school hours and on a home
216
computer. Also like J.S., Layshock posted a picture of Mr. Trosch on
the profile, which he copied and pasted from the school district’s
217
website.
In a section titled “[T]ell me about yourself,” the profile
featured fictitious answers to a set of survey questions:
Birthday: too drunk to remember
Are you a health freak: big steroid freak
In the past month have you smoked: big blunt
In the past month have you been on pills: big pills
In the past month have you gone Skinny Dipping: big lake, not
big dick
In the past month have you Stolen Anything: big keg
Ever been drunk: big number of times
Ever been called a Tease: big whore
210. Id. at 931.
211. Id. at 930.
212. Id. at 929–30.
213. Id. at 930 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012).
215. Id. at 207–08.
216. Id. at 207 (explaining that Layshock created the profile page using his
grandmother’s computer).
217. Id. at 207–08.
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Ever been Beaten up: big fag
Ever Shoplifted: big bag of kmart [sic]
218
Number of Drugs I have taken: big
Further, he listed “Transgender, Appreciators of Alcoholic
Beverages” as “Interests” of Mr. Trosch, and “Steroids International”
219
was included as an organization to which Mr. Trosch was a member.
The profile was viewed by other students whom Layshock listed as
“friends,” who included “most, if not all,” of the students that attended
220
Hickory High School. Not long after Justin created the fake profile,
three other students created bogus profiles of Mr. Trosch and posted
them to MySpace, all of which were more vulgar and offensive than
221
Justin’s profile.
The profiles were viewed during school hours,
although the school was unable to determine how many students
222
actually accessed them.
When Mr. Trosch learned of the fake profiles—which he believed to
223
be “‘degrading,’ ‘demeaning,’ ‘demoralizing,’ and ‘shocking,’” —and
224
that Layshock created the original profile, he punished Layshock with
225
Additionally, Layshock was
a ten-day, out-of-school suspension.
placed in the Alternative Education Program for the remainder of the
school year, was banned from all extracurricular activities, and was not
226
allowed to participate in his high school graduation ceremony.
The Third Circuit ruled that the school district violated Layshock’s
First Amendment free speech rights by punishing his expressive
227
conduct. The issue the court focused on was whether Layshock’s use
of Mr. Trosch’s picture, obtained from the School District’s website, was
228
The court struck down the School
considered entering the school.

218. Id. at 208.
219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 209.
223. Id.
224. Mr. Trosch’s daughter who was in eleventh grade informed Mr. Trosch about the
profiles. Id. at 208. He discovered all three profiles and learned that Layshock was
responsible for creating the first about six days later. Id. at 208–09.
225. Id. at 210.
226. Id. at 210.
227. Id. at 216.
228. Id. at 214–15, 219. The District Court found no substantial disruption occurred by
using the website, nor could one reasonably conclude that the profile would cause substantial
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District’s argument that using the district’s website to obtain a
photograph “forge[d] a nexus between the School and [Layshock’s]
229
profile.” Because Layshock’s “expression” was considered outside the
230
schoolhouse gate, the court refused to apply Fraser, and ultimately
concluded that the school was not allowed to discipline Layshock for his
231
expressive conduct.
The cases above illustrate several courts’ attempts to protect student
expression that occurs on the Internet. The courts in Beussink and
Evans seemed to focus on the content of the speech when determining
232
that the speech deserved protection.
The courts were unwilling to
limit speech that expressed a negative opinion of the school and school
233
The Third Circuit decisions,
authorities but did nothing more.
however, displayed a hesitancy to reach beyond the school yard, even
though the content of the student speech was arguably offensive to some
234
viewers.
Trying to unify and make sense of the lower courts’ holdings in
student Internet speech cases is frustrating. The inconsistencies in the
lower courts’ holdings leave schools at a troubling position when
deciding whether they have the ability to discipline a student for
offensive speech aimed at the school or school authorities. Comparing
these cases with those in Part III.A exemplifies the necessity of a
Supreme Court ruling.
IV. TINKER IN THE INTERNET AGE
The

Internet—“an

international

network

of

interconnected

disruption in the future. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d
587, 600–01 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (“The actual disruption was rather minimal—no classes were
cancelled, no widespread disorder occurred, there was no violence or student disciplinary
action.”), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 650 F.3d 205 (3rd. Cir. 2011).
229. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214–15.
230. Id. at 216 (“It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions there
to the same extent that it can control that child when he/she participates in school sponsored
activities.”).
231. Id. at 219.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 187, 194.
233. See Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (noting that the
student’s language “was not lewd, vulgar, threatening, or advocating illegal or dangerous
behavior”); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181
(E.D. Mo. 1998) (noting that “no significant disruption to school discipline occurred”).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 194–231.
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235

computers” that enables “millions of people to communicate with one
another and to access vast amounts of information from around the
236
237
world” —is now an essential tool in many peoples’ daily lives.
Because of the Internet’s increasingly important role in society,
eventually the Supreme Court will have to rule on the constitutionality
238
of schools disciplining student expression on the Internet. Taking into
account the Court’s history of emphasizing the role of schools in
239
instilling democratic values and the role the Internet plays in
240
adolescent’s daily lives, our nation’s high court will likely decide that
schools do have some discretion to control student Internet expression
to preserve the school’s educational mission. Part IV.A will examine
the characteristics of the evolving Internet and the implications for
student expression. Part IV.B will then discuss how Internet speech
disrupts the school environment and why schools should be given
discretion to regulate this type of student speech.
A. The Internet as a Social Context
For today’s young people, a time when the Internet was not
immediately accessible is virtually unfathomable. Given labels such as
241
“Net natives,” “the Internet generation,” “cyberkids,” and “the digital
235. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
236. Id. at 850.
237. See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, SOCIAL
MEDIA & MOBILE INTERNET USE AMONG TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 5 (2010),
available at http://www.pewInternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx
(discussing the rising Internet use among teens and young adults).
238. The Supreme Court denied Blue Mountain School District’s petition for certiorari
on January 17, 2012. Lyle Denniston, Students, MySpace and the First Amendment,
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lyle-denniston/studentsmyspace-and-the-_b_1214709.html. The general counsel for the National School Boards
Association was disappointed by the Court’s decision to deny certiorari:
We've missed an opportunity to really clarify for school districts what their
responsibility and authority is at a time when kids are using electronic media
instantaneously, and especially when those messages are so impactful and
immediate on the school setting . . . . This is one of those cases where the law is
simply lagging behind the times.
Maryclaire Dale, Supreme Court Rejects Appeal by Blue Mountain School District,
REBUBLICANHERALD.COM, Jan. 18, 2012, http://republicanherald.com/news/supreme-court-r
ejects-appeal-by-blue-mountain-school-district-1.1259142 (internal quotation marks omitted).
239. See discussion supra Part II.A.
240. See generally LENHART ET AL., supra note 237.
241. Kathryn C. Montgomery, Youth and Digital Democracy: Intersections of Practice,
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242

generation,” today’s young people have incorporated the Internet into
243
their daily lives much quicker than any other age group. A study from
September 2009 showed that 93% of teenagers between age twelve and
seventeen use the Internet—compared to 74% of adults age eighteen
244
and older.
Approximately two-thirds of those teenagers use the
Internet every day, with at least a little over one-third of them going
245
online several times a day. Further, access to the Internet is no longer
limited to sitting in front of a desktop, clicking a mouse, and typing on a
keyboard. Although desktop and laptop computers remain the most
popular machines used to go online, young people are increasingly using
portable devices such as cell phones, tablets, and handheld gaming
246
devices to wirelessly access the Internet from any location.
Early conceptualizations of the Internet in relation to society
247
equated the Internet with a separate, physical place.
Likewise, the
theories on the relationship between the Internet and society suggested
that Internet users could separate their online selves from their off-line
248
selves.
These theories suggested that a clear distinction existed
between the online world and off-line world. By separating their online
lives from their off-line lives, Internet users remained anonymous and
249
explored social worlds unconnected to their real-world lives, perhaps
250
taking advantage of a way to play and experiment with their identities.
With this understanding of the Internet, making a distinction between
Internet postings of a student off school grounds and those made by a
student while at school made sense.

Policy, and the Marketplace, in CIVIC LIFE ONLINE: LEARNING HOW DIGITAL MEDIA CAN
ENGAGE YOUTH 25, 25 (W. Lance Bennett ed., 2008).
242. SONIA LIVINGSTONE, CHILDREN AND THE INTERNET 21 (2009) (citations
omitted).
243. Montgomery, supra note 241, at 25.
244. LENHART ET AL., supra note 237, at 5.
245. Id. at 7 (demonstrating that 63% of teens go online every day while 36% go online
several times a day).
246. Id. at 14.
247. See generally Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003). We even speak of the Internet in spatial terms.
See id. at 453–54 (highlighting various examples).
248. See GUSTAVO S. MESCH & ILAN TALMUD, WIRED YOUTH: THE SOCIAL WORLD
OF ADOLESCENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 5 (2010).
249. Id. at 5–6.
250. See KAVERI SUBRAHMANYAM & DAVID ŠMAHEL, DIGITAL YOUTH: THE ROLE
OF MEDIA IN DEVELOPMENT 35 (2011).
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As the Internet—and our understanding of it—evolved, the
251
metaphor of the Internet as a place has diminished.
Moreover, the
expansion of the Internet has resulted in its evolution from merely an
252
information and communication tool to a social context. People use
the Internet to interact with friends, meet new people, participate in
253
groups, and engage communities. A modern theory of the relationship
between the Internet and society views the Internet as a cultural tool
254
reflecting real-life social conditions.
The rapid expansion of the
Internet and the use of tools such as smart phones and social networking
sites have changed the online environment from a place where a user
can be someone else to a medium that is intertwined with the user’s off255
line life. Social networking sites, especially, serve as platforms where
users’ “online dialogue mirrors the exchange of ideas and opinions that
happens throughout people’s lives off-line, in conversations at home, at
256
work, in cafes, and in classrooms.”
As a result, the line between online and off-line is blurred, and
young people in particular “are bringing the people and issues from
257
their off-line lives into their online worlds and interactions.”
Researchers have consequently characterized the Internet as a social

251. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003).
252. SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 250, at 103.
253. Id.
254. MESCH & TALMUD, supra note 248, at 8; see SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra
note 250, at 34.
255. See SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 250, at 35.
256. Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communi
tystandards/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). Recognizing the interplay of online and off-line social
interactions, Facebook established standards for online behavior, one of which states that
“claiming to be another person” is in violation of their terms and undermines the trust of the
users on the Facebook community. Id. The quoted language is no longer part of Facebook’s
Community Standards. It was replaced with:
Facebook gives people around the world the power to publish their own stories,
see the world through the eyes of many other people, and connect and share
wherever they go. The conversation that happens on Facebook—and the opinions
expressed here—mirror the diversity of the people using Facebook.
Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandard
s/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2012); see also Parody, Commentary, and Fan Accounts Policy,
TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/33-report-a-violation/topics/148-policy-informati
on/articles/106373-parody-commentary-and-fan-accounts-policy (last visited Nov. 17, 2012)
(allowing users to create parody and fan accounts as long as the user clearly indicates that the
profile is fake).
257. SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 250, at 36.

14 SULLIVAN (DO NOT DELETE)

726

3/6/2013 9:32 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[96:689

context for adolescent development, on par with other contexts like
258
church, home, school, and work.
“Children and young people’s
[online] activities are primarily exploratory, seeking freedoms online
that may be constrained off-line, negotiating the social expressions of
identity, developing new forms of valued expertise, taking risks with
social norms and personal experiences and, ultimately, integrating
259
Thus, the Internet has
online and off-line in developing [the self].”
become more than just a medium for information and mass
communication; rather, it is a dynamic entity that penetrates all spheres
of life and has the capacity to influence adolescents’ social relationships,
260
leisure activities, cultural values, and beliefs.
Not only are Internet users’ online activities intertwined with their
off-line lives, but the nature of the Internet allows users to reach the
261
masses.
As the Supreme Court stated in Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with a
phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
262
pamphleteer.” Significantly, an Internet user’s “voice”—especially an
adolescent Internet user—often resonates with a harsher, less inhibited
263
tone than it would off-line.
These characteristics of the Internet and its users have important
implications for student expression.
Essentially, the Internet is

258. Id. at 34, 137.
259. LIVINGSTONE, supra note 242, at 31.
260. See SUBRAHMANYAM & ŠMAHEL, supra note 250, at 32; see also Charlie Stross,
LOGIN 2009 Keynote: Gaming in the World of 2030, ANTIPOPE.ORG (May, 13, 2009, 10:12
PM), http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2009/05/login-2009-keynote-gaming-in-t.htm
l (“Welcome to a world where the Internet has turned inside-out; instead of being something
you visit inside a box with a coloured screen, it’s draped all over the landscape around you,
invisible until you put on a pair of glasses or pick up your always-on mobile phone. A phone
which is to today’s iPhone as a modern laptop is to an original Apple II; a device which
always knows where you are, where your possessions are, and without which you are—
literally—lost and forgetful.”).
261. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2004) (identifying five
ways the Internet makes speech more salient).
262. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
263. See Waldman, Badmouthing Authority, supra note 4, at 647–49 (examining why the
characteristics of the Internet coupled with adolescence has led to hostile Internet speech
about school officials).
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264

everywhere; it has no physical, social, or cultural boundaries. Because
of its pervasiveness, any on-campus/off-campus distinction about
Internet expression makes little sense and should therefore be
265
abandoned.
What is the difference, for example, between a student
who uses a school computer to post a vulgar comment about a school
official that is read by his classmates, and a student who stands on a
public sidewalk facing the school using his iPhone to post the same
266
comment?
With the rise in the use of handheld Internet-capable devices such as
267
tablets and smart phones, it is even difficult to differentiate the student
who stands on a podium in the school assembly hall and calls her
teacher a “douchebag” from the student who types a similar sentiment
on her Facebook Timeline (which is instantaneously available for her
268
classmates to view).
Because the Internet is not static but rather an

264. See Kathryn Gregory, How Have Facebook & Other Forms of Social Media
Changed the Way We Interact? Both Sides of the Story: High School Students, Leaders Differ
on Impact, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 2012, at 1F, available at
http://sundaygazettemail.com/News/201202030259 (interviewing a high school principal who
suggests that students are addicted to their cell phones and worries that “[i]t’s very hard for
them to pay attention on what is going on in the classroom when they are
focused on what is going on on that phone”).
265. See, e.g., Li, supra note 8, at 92–93 (suggesting that courts abandon the oncampus/off-campus distinction when analyzing student Internet speech).
266. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir.
2011) (en banc) (suggesting that punishing a student for content on a website created outside
of school “would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097
(2012).
267. According to a PEW survey conducted in 2011, 77% of teens have a cell phone,
and about one in four of those teens has a smart phone.
AMANDA LENHART,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TEENS, SMARTPHONES, & TEXTING 6–7 (2012), available
at http://pewInternet.org/Reports/2012/Teens-and-smartphones.aspx.
Moreover, teens
communicate via their phones more than they have face-to-face conversations. Id. at 16–18
(showing that on a daily basis, 63% of the teens surveyed communicated through text
message and 29% communicated through social networking sites, while only 25%
communicated face-to-face with their friends outside of school).
268. See Deb Nicklay, Social Media Presents New Challenges to Educators,
GLOBEGAZETTE.COM, Feb. 4, 2012, http://globegazette.com/news/local/social-mediapresents-new-challenges-to-educators/article_fde0fd7a-4fbc-11e1-85e6-0019bb2963f4.html
(quoting the legal services director School Administrators of Iowa: “Fifteen years ago you
might have something said about you at a lunchroom table in front of 15 to 20 kids . . . . On
Facebook some kids have 2,000 to 3,000 ‘friends’—and once something is posted it goes to
that many people immediately.”). A Timeline is a Facebook user’s “collection of the photos,
stories, and experiences that tell [the user’s] story.” Glossary of Terms, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/glossary (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
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interactive and dynamic communicative tool, any expression that targets
school or school officials will almost inevitably reach the school. If the
Internet really was a separate place, distinct and isolated from our “real
world” lives, then prohibiting schools from regulating student Internet
speech would make sense. However, that is not the case. The limitless
and pervasive nature of the Internet allows an expression typed by a
student on his laptop at home to ring loud and clear through the halls at
school. In order to uphold its educational mission, a school needs to be
able to use its discretion to limit speech that is damaging to that
objective.
B. Disruption to the Educational Process
A disparaging comment about a teacher or school administrator on a
social networking website is not merely a student expressing himself;
rather, that comment may have an effect on the educational process if it
reaches the school. In order to effectively teach students about how to
be responsible and knowledgeable citizens in a democratic society,
teachers need to be able to establish a teacher–pupil relationship that is
269
based on respect and influence.
The Court has addressed the
important roles of teachers in Ambach v. Norwick:
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part
in developing students’ attitude toward government and
understanding of the role of citizens in our society. Alone
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-today contact with students both in the classrooms and in the other
varied activities of a modern school. In shaping the students’
experience to achieve educational goals, teachers . . . are
responsible for presenting and explaining the subject matter in a
way that is both comprehensible and inspiring . . . . Further, a
teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle
but important influence over their perceptions and values . . . .
This influence is crucial to the continued good health of a
270
democracy.
An Internet posting about a school official may not cause a
“substantial disruption” in the literal sense that it “disrupt[s] immediate

269. See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text.
270. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1979).
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271

classroom activity or school discipline.”
Nevertheless, an Internet
posting about a teacher may certainly cause a substantial disruption to
the educational process in several other ways. For instance, as one
commentator points out, “verbal aggression towards teachers can be a
272
source of significant stress for teachers.”
As a result, teachers may
become disengaged from their classrooms or even decide to leave the
273
Additionally, if student Internet speech has the
profession entirely.
overall effect of damaging that teacher’s reputation or distorting her
students’ perceptions about her ability to effectively teach, the teacher
271. Tabor, supra note 10, at 593 (citation omitted).
272. Waldman, Badmouthing Authority, supra note 4, at 644. Elona Hartjes discussed
teachers’ reactions to being bullied by students in her blog. Elona Hartjes, Some Students
Bully Teachers Too, TEACHERS AT RISK (May 7, 2007), http://www.teachersatrisk.com/2007/
05/07/some-students-bully-teachers-too/. Some teachers provided stories for how they have
been harassed by students and the effect of the harassment on their ability to teach:
I’ve had almost all I can handle . . . . I have a class of kids who is absolutely
disrespectful—one has gone so far as to yell at me, call me names, using her cell
phone (even though there [are] rules about it), tell me not only am I stupid but so is
anything that I do or have the class do. I have tried talking to her only to have her
tell me that she’s not going to put up with this . . . . I cried today. [F]or the first time
in front of students, I cried. I couldn’t help it . . . . This girl does her work. It’s the
nasty comments she makes about it. It’s constant . . . . Although some students are
wonderful, I keep telling myself that it’s one kid—but that only goes so far because
she is making me miserable and [I]’m finding it really difficult to do my job.
Valerie, Comment to Some Students Bully Teachers Too, TEACHERS AT RISK (Apr. 23, 2008,
9:07 PM), http://www.teachersatrisk.com/2007/05/07/some-students-bully-teachers-too/.
I’m a teacher [and] I have already figured out which students have written
slanderous comments about me . . . . I am ready to quit teaching. I try as hard as I
can to do my best to teach students but they have very little respect these days and
their parents have no idea what their children are doing [online]. I’ve already
invested 22 years in my career and I hoping I can stick it out another 8 more years –
then I will happily retire and move on.
Angela, Comment to Some Students Bully Teachers Too, TEACHERS AT RISK (Oct. 14, 2009,
1:42 AM), http://www.teachersatrisk.com/2007/05/07/some-students-bully-teachers-too/.
For me[] years of false accusations [about] hitting kids, yelling, slamming heads into
walls, gradually turned into accusations of sexual predation. The final straw was
being accused by some of the most disruptive kids in the class of trying to film their
chests when I attempted to film them working on year end projects. I used to live in
Paraguay, one of the most corrupt countries on earth. Nothing I can think of from
that experience comes close to the treatment I received in my own country.
Karl Liebhardt, Comment to Some Students Bully Teachers Too, TEACHERS AT RISK (Nov.
26, 2011, 4:06 AM), http://www.teachersatrisk.com/2007/05/07/some-students-bully-teacherstoo/.
273. Waldman, Badmouthing Authority, supra note 4, at 644–46.
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may not be viewed as a role model, perhaps losing that influence which
274
is crucial to her role as an educator.
These are instances when the
275
educational process may certainly be disrupted.
To be clear, many students use the Internet as an outlet to vent their
276
frustrations about school. Most of these expressions would likely be
protected speech because they are generally anonymous and have no
connection to the students’ schools. It is when a student goes as far as
creating a false profile or humiliate a teacher online—similar to J.S. and
277
278
K.L. or Justin Layshock —where that speech should no longer be
279
considered protected.
To be sure, sometimes an Internet posting or
fictitious profile may be so “outrageous” that a student should be able to
disassociate the “fake” ideas expressed online from the “real” teacher
280
instructing them at the front of the classroom.
However, in today’s
digital society where the line between the online and off-line world is
281
students may actually have a more difficult time
blurring,
differentiating the outrageous from the genuine. Therefore, to ensure
that schools can effectively fulfill their educational mission of instilling
democratic values, the schools must be able to regulate certain Internet
expression that has an impact on the school environment.

274. Supra note 272 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 273.
276. The author of this comment attempted several Internet searches, including “I hate
my teacher,” “I hate my school,” and “my teacher sucks.” The result was thousands of sites,
including forums, YouTube videos, Facebook pages, and blogs where students vented about
their teachers and schools.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 194–203.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 215–19.
279. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Ed., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d
Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring) (“School authorities can regulate indecent language
because its circulation on school grounds undermines their responsibility to try to promote
standards of decency and civility among school children . . . . With its captive audience of
children, many of whom, along with their parents, legitimately expect reasonable regulation, a
school need not capitulate to a student’s preference for vulgar expression. A school’s
authority to condemn indecent language is not inconsistent with a student’s right to express
his views.”).
280. See Snyder II, 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 258–68.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court seems hesitant to decide whether schools may
282
regulate student Internet speech.
Perhaps the Court is hesitant to
develop a standard for speech involving rapidly-changing technology
until it more fully understands the impact of the Internet in the school
283
setting.
Nevertheless, in each of the four student speech cases, the
Court indicated that a school provides a unique context for student
rights, and, in light of that unique context, the Court balanced the
284
school’s interests with the student’s rights. Because the Internet has
no boundaries, speech that implicates the school or school personnel
should be analyzed under Tinker’s substantial disruption test as if it
were spoken within the bricks and mortar of the building.
Because of the Supreme Court’s silence, state and local legislatures
285
need to step in and address the issue. As discussed above, many state
constitutions and statutes include educational objectives that identify
schools as places where students learn respect and prepare for
286
citizenship.
Student Internet speech that harasses or impersonates a
school authority figure is contrary to these educational objectives and,
therefore, should be punishable under this standard if it causes the sort
287
288
of disruption mentioned above or invades a teacher’s rights.
As
stated by the Supreme Court, “The schools, as instruments of the state,
may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot
be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive

282. See supra note 243.
283. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (identifying the
“challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology”).
284. See discussion supra Part III.
285. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 421 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Local
school boards, not the courts, should determine what pedagogical interests are ‘legitimate’
and what rules ‘reasonably relat[e]’ to those interests.” (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988))). For example, North Carolina has already taken action
against Internet postings that disparage teachers by making it a crime to “intimidate or
torment” teachers online. Steve Eder, Teachers Fight Online Slams: Amid Free-Speech
Concerns, Law Targets Comments that ‘Torment’ Faculty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2012, at A3;
see 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 149 §14-458.2 (outlining a cyber-bullying provision that prohibits
such activities as creating fake profiles or Web sites, or posting real or doctored images of
school employees on the Internet).
286. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 271–75 and accompanying text.
288. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1986).
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speech and conduct . . . .”
Indeed, “schools may not be enclaves of
290
totalitarianism,” but a school cannot function as an educational
institution if its students are allowed to bypass this educational
objective.
Admittedly, determining what type of Internet expression should
and should not be punishable is difficult to decide and depends on the
individual facts and the type of speech. But schools are given broad
291
discretion to manage their day-to-day affairs.
Most schools have
student handbooks or codes of conduct that provide notice to students
292
concerning what types of behaviors are punishable.
Perhaps school
districts could simply include a clause in these manuals indicating that
the student code of conduct applies to inappropriate expression on the
Internet that disrupts or may disrupt the educational process at the
school, notwithstanding where the expression originated. A broad
statement such as that would provide a student with sufficient notice
that Internet activity is punishable; yet it allows the school discretion in
determining whether a specific activity is actually disruptive to the
educational process.
293
The Internet is evolving.
Even over a few short years, it has
294
drastically become increasingly intertwined with our daily functions.
Once the Internet is more commonly understood as something greater
than an information and communication tool, society may come to
appreciate the significant impact that it has on individuals, even in the
295
“off-line” world. Likewise, student expressions on the Internet have a
great impact on the school environment, especially if the expressions are
296
What one student writes
directed at a teacher or school authority.
online about a teacher may influence how another student views that
teacher, and could result in a loss of respect for the teacher and lack of
297
subordination necessary in a teacher-pupil relationship. Therefore, it
is necessary that the Supreme Court steps in to clarify the authority

289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863–64 (1982) (citations omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 50–52.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 250–63.
See supra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 269–74 and accompanying text.
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schools have over student Internet speech in light of the educational
mission of the school and the students’ First Amendment rights.
MAUREEN SULLIVAN
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